Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 72 | Issue 2

Article 7

2007

Voluntary Surgical Castration of Sex Offenders:
Waiving the Eighth Amendment Protection from
Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Lystra Batchoo

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
Recommended Citation
Lystra Batchoo, Voluntary Surgical Castration of Sex Offenders: Waiving the Eighth Amendment Protection from Cruel and Unusual
Punishment, 72 Brook. L. Rev. (2007).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol72/iss2/7

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law Review
by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.

Voluntary Surgical Castration of Sex
Offenders
WAIVING THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION
FROM CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
INTRODUCTION
In July 2005, Keith Raymond Fremin was about to go on
trial in Covington, Louisiana for four counts of aggravated
rape1 involving an eleven-year-old girl and her thirteen-yearold sister.2 Fremin, a neighborhood resident, first gained the
girls’ trust before victimizing them.3 Fremin started playing
basketball with the young girls,4 eventually invited them to his
home and sexually abused them.5 One of the victims told a
classmate about the abuse and later reported the incidents to
her teacher.6 Police arrested Fremin on January 27, 2004.7
Like most sex offenders, this was not Fremin’s first offense.
When police charged him with the 1999 rapes of these sisters,

1

Under Louisiana law, aggravated rape occurs when

the anal, oral, or vaginal sexual intercourse is deemed to be without lawful
consent of the victim because it is committed under any one or more of the
following circumstances:
(1) When the victim resists the act to the utmost, but whose resistance is
overcome by force.
(2) When the victim is prevented from resisting the act by threats of great
and immediate bodily harm, accompanied by apparent power of execution.
(3) When the victim is prevented from resisting the act because the offender
is armed with a dangerous weapon.
(4) When the victim is under the age of thirteen years.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42 (Supp. 2006).
2
Meghan Gordon, Child Rapist OKs Surgical Castration: Rare Penalty
Avoids Possible Life in Jail, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), July 13, 2005, at 1.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
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Fremin was already on probation for molesting another young
girl in 2003.8
Fremin would face life imprisonment if a jury convicted
him of this latest sexual offense.9 But prior to the start of trial,
Fremin decided to plead guilty to two counts of forcible rape10
and two counts of molestation.11 He also volunteered to be
surgically castrated.12
The victims, then seventeen and
nineteen-year old young women, agreed to the plea bargain.13
The Louisiana State Court judge, Donald Fendlason, accepted
the plea bargain and agreed to reduce Fremin’s sentence from
forty years to twenty-five years in prison without parole or
probation if Fremin underwent surgical castration.14 If Fremin
did not undergo the procedure by August 18, 2005, the judge
retained the authority to revoke the reduced sentence.15
Due to the unique nature of sex offenders,16 it has been
difficult for government agencies and courts to effectively
punish sex offender activity. Research has shown that sex
offenders do not change their behavior in response to

8

Gordon, supra note 2.
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:537 (2005). Prosecutors decided to seek a
sentence of life in prison. Gordon, supra note 2.
10
Forcible rape, as compared to aggravated rape, is committed when
9

the anal, oral, or vaginal sexual intercourse is deemed to be without the
lawful consent of the victim because it is committed under any one or more of
the following circumstances:
(1) When the victim is prevented from resisting the act by force or threats of
physical violence under circumstances where the victim reasonably believes
that such resistance would not prevent the rape.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42.1 (Supp. 2006). The maximum sentence for forcible rape
under Louisiana law is forty years. See id.
11
Gordon, supra note 2.
12
Id. Surgical castration is an irreversible procedure that involves removal
of the testes, which produce male hormones. See infra Part I.
13
Gordon, supra note 2.
14
Id.
15
Plea Agreement Includes Castration, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2005, at A20. As
of late August 2005, Fremin had not undergone the procedure and subsequent hearings
on his case were postponed due to Hurricane Katrina. E-mail from Meghan Gordon,
Staff Writer, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans) (Jan. 3, 2006, 12:43:00 EST) (on file with
author).
16
Sex offenders are divided into four types. A Type I offender denies
commission of the crime. The Type II offender will admit to committing the crime but
will blame the commission on nonsexual or non-personal forces, such as drugs or
stress. A Type III offender engages in violent behavior prompted by non-sexual gain,
such as power or anger. The Type IV offender is a paraphiliac who demonstrates a
pattern of sexual arousal, erection, or ejaculation. Kimberly A. Peters, Chemical
Castration: An Alternative to Incarceration, 31 DUQ. L. REV. 307, 312 (1993).
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traditional deterrents, such as prison, reproach from society,
and other shame-inducing alternatives.17
Sex offenders are not a homogenous group and
This makes
motivations to commit sex offenses vary.18
categorizing or treating sex offenders difficult.19 “Studies have
shown that incarcerated child molesters continue to victimize
young children once they are released on parole.”20 The United
States Department of Justice reports that sex offenders are
four times more likely than non-sex offenders to be rearrested
for another crime after their discharge from prison.21 High
recidivism rates suggest that incarceration alone is ineffective
and does not deter future sex offenses.22 As a result, state
legislatures have turned to innovative and unusual approaches
to punish sex offenders.23 Castration of sex offenders is among
17

Avital Stadler, California Injects New Life Into an Old Idea: Taking a Shot
at Recidivism, Chemical Castration, and the Constitution, 46 EMORY L.J. 1285, 1285
(1997) (“[S]exual offenders apparently do not change their behavior in response to
traditional disincentives such as prison, shame and the like, to the same degree that
ordinary criminals do.”).
18
Carol Gilchrist, An Examination of the Effectiveness of California’s
Chemical Castration Bill in Preventing Sex Offenders from Reoffending, 7 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 181, 186 (1998) (“Although all pedophiles exhibit [an] attraction to
prepubescent children, child molesters are not a homogenous group. No accepted or
empirically derived reason explains why people are attracted to minors . . . .”).
19
Id. (stating that “because sex offenders’ motivations vary, sex offenders
cannot be easily categorized or cured”).
20
Jennifer M. Bund, Did You Say Chemical Castration?, 59 U. PITT. L. REV.
157, 162 (1997).
21
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Criminal Offenders Statistics, http://www.ojp.
usdoj.gov/bjs/crimoff.htm#sex (last visited Sept. 14, 2006).
22
Bund, supra note 20.
23
Such innovative and unusual approaches to punishing and deterring sex
offender activity include two recent appellate court decisions. Those cases held that
sexually explicit writing can be considered child pornography and that a person can be
punished for sexually fantasizing about children. Jennifer B. Siverts, Punishing
Thoughts Too Close to Reality: A New Solution to Protect Children from Pedophiles, 27
T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 393, 407 (2005) (discussing State v. Dalton, 793 N.E.2d 509 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2003) and Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2004)). One attempt
to deter sex offender activity requires sex offenders to register with the local
communities in which they settle after completing their prison sentence. Katie
Granlund, Does Societal Input Lead to Successful Sex Offender Legislation?, 29 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REV. 197, 206 (2005) (discussing Megan’s Law, which requires a state to
release information to the public about registered sex offenders). A recent development
in imposing harsher penalties for sex offenders involves requiring offenders to wear
global positioning ankle bracelets for a decade or more after they get out of prison.
Kim Chandler, Tougher Penalties OK’d for Sex Offenders: Some Must Wear Ankle
Bracelet Monitors for Decade or Longer After Leaving Prison, BIRMINGHAM NEWS (Ala.),
July 27, 2005, at 1. Alabama’s legislature became one of the first to enact this
program. Id. Florida also requires certain offenders to wear the bracelets for life and
New Jersey has approved a two-year pilot program. Id. Other states are currently
experimenting with the idea. Id. Additionally, one recent case highlights the newest
approach states might use to preempt sex offenders from re-offending.
In
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the methods states are using to fill the gaps left by more
traditional punishments.
The case of Keith Fremin adds a new dimension to the
ongoing debate about using castration to punish sex offenders24
since Fremin volunteered25 for surgical castration in exchange
for a reduced sentence.26 First, surgical castration raises the
issue of whether such a punishment violates the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment.27 Second, since the procedure has been considered
cruel and unusual punishment by one state supreme court28
and is unlikely to pass constitutional scrutiny if it reaches the
United States Supreme Court,29 surgical castration raises the
Pennsylvania, a young woman married for three years to a previously convicted sex
offender became pregnant with his child. The husband had been convicted twenty-two
years earlier of rape and sodomy of two teenage girls and served ten years in jail.
Pennsylvania authorities monitored the woman’s pregnancy and, upon her giving
birth, removed the newborn from its home pursuant to a court order. Kate Zernike,
Officials Remove Newborn over Father’s Abuse Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2005, at A5.
Even the power of celebrity is being used to protect children from sex offenders. In
October 2005, Oprah Winfrey launched a campaign on her daytime television show in
which she appealed to the public to help locate, arrest, and convict sex offenders on the
run. See Child Predator Watch List, http://www2.oprah.com/presents/2005/predator/
predator_main.jhtml (last visited Sept. 14, 2006).
24
See generally Linda Beckman, Chemical Castration: Constitutional Issues
of Due Process, Equal Protection, and Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 100 W. VA. L.
REV. 853 (1998) (listing the constitutional issues that mandatory chemical castration
raises).
25
Some scholars have argued that waiver of a constitutional right pursuant
to plea bargaining can never be voluntary. Edward A. Fitzgerald, Chemical Castration:
MPA Treatment of the Sexual Offender, 18 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 21 (1990) (“Critics
contend that since a convicted offender will go to great lengths to retain his freedom—
including bartering his body—voluntary consent to [chemical castration] is
precluded.”); Pamela K. Hicks, Castration of Sexual Offenders: Legal and Ethical
Issues, 14 J. LEGAL MED. 641, 651 (1993) (“The mere fact that the accused must face
the consequences of his crime does not make consent invalid. The pressure in making
a decision alone does not vitiate a voluntary act or admission if state actors do not
impose any coercion or duress.”); Jeffrey N. Hurwitz, House Arrest: A Critical Analysis
of an Intermediate-Level Penal Sanction, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 794-95 (1987)
(“[A]lthough the doctrine appears to expand individual choices by allowing a person to
forego a given right in exchange for some benefit, waiver of rights often occurs in
situations where the individual has, in fact, no real choice at all.”). While there are
strong arguments in support of that position, for the purposes of this Note, we assume
that sex offenders who choose surgical castration make a voluntary rather than coerced
choice.
26
Gordon, supra note 2 (stating that “Fremin . . . volunteered to undergo
castration, a move criminal justice experts called extremely rare” and that the
“[P]resident of the Louisiana Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers . . . said the
surgery is a ‘very unusual’ penalty that could only be initiated by the defendant”).
27
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
28
See discussion infra Part II.B.
29
See discussion infra Part III.
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question of whether a sex offender who has voluntarily chosen
to undergo the procedure should be able to waive the Eighth
Amendment protection.
This Note focuses on the legal and practical reasons sex
offenders should be able to waive the Eighth Amendment
protection and choose surgical castration. Part I of this Note
discusses why surgical castration is an effective approach to
punishing sex offenders and the growing acceptance of the
procedure.
Part II examines the history of the Eighth
Amendment’s protection from cruel and unusual punishment
and cases interpreting the constitutionality of surgical
castration. Part III of this Note then applies the analytical
framework created by the Supreme Court to determine when a
punishment violates the Eighth Amendment and argues that
surgical castration is cruel and unusual punishment.
Part IV examines waiver of the Eighth Amendment
protection and asserts that, in cases where sex offenders
volunteer for surgical castration, society’s interest in the
Eighth Amendment is diminished. Therefore, sex offenders
should be permitted to waive the Eighth Amendment and
choose surgical castration. Finally, Part V proposes that the
best approach to determining when surgical castration, and
therefore a waiver of a constitutional protection, is acceptable
requires courts to balance the interests of the defendant,
criminal justice system, and society.

694

I.

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:2

SURGICAL CASTRATION AS A RESPONSE TO SEX
OFFENDER ACTIVITY

Surgical castration,30 also known as orchiectomy, is an
irreversible procedure that involves the removal of the testes,
which produce the male hormones.31 It does not involve
amputation of the penis.32 The procedure itself is simple and
30
Castration of sex offenders is not a new concept. In the past decade,
chemical castration has emerged as a response to sex offender activity. The procedure
involves the use of medroxyprogesterone acetate (“MPA”), which is more commonly
known as Depo-Provera, a birth control drug for women. The drug restricts the release
of luteinizing hormones from the pituitary gland. This treatment addresses sex
offenders’ inability to control their sexually offensive behavior. Peters, supra note 16,
at 310-11. By reducing testosterone levels, the drug also diminishes compulsive erotic
fantasies and lowers male sex drive. Id. at 311. The drug does not cause impotence
during treatment and individuals can still experience erections and ejaculations.
Karen J. Rebish, Nipping the Problem in the Bud: The Constitutionality of California’s
Castration Law, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 507, 518 (1998). In 1996, California
became the first state to enact chemical castration legislation in response to sex
offender activity. See Philip J. Henderson, Section 645 of the California Penal Code:
California’s “Chemical Castration” Law—A Panacea or Cruel and Unusual
Punishment?, 32 U.S.F. L. REV. 653, 653 (1998). A number of other states followed
California’s lead and more than half have either considered or passed chemical
castration legislation. Robert D. Miller, Forced Administration of Sex-Drive Reducing
Medications to Sex Offenders: Treatment or Punishment?, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L.
175, 188 (1998). There has been a vocal community of critics, including medical
practitioners and the American Civil Liberties Union, against chemical castration of
sex offenders. Hicks, supra note 25, at 665-66; Siverts, supra note 23, at 403
(“California’s bold measure has raised the eyebrows of more than a few critics, most
notably the American Civil Liberties Union, which has condemned the law as cruel and
unusual punishment.”). But see Lisa Keesling, Practicing Medicine Without a License:
Legislative Attempts to Mandate Chemical Castration for Repeat Sex Offenders, 32 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 381, 395 n.129 (1999) (In a June 1994 survey of American voters
conducted by Princeton Survey Research, 59% of respondents said they supported
surgical or chemical castration for repeat sex offenders.). See also Douglas J. Besharov
& Andrew Vachhs, Sex Offenders: Is Castration an Acceptable Punishment?, 78
A.B.A.J. 42 (“[C]hemical ‘castration’ . . . has been an accepted treatment for many sex
offenders.”). Chemical castration is not an effective method of dealing with sex
offender activity for a number of reasons. Unlike surgical castration, chemical
castration does not permanently alter the sex offender since testosterone levels can
normalize once the injections cease. Stadler, supra note 17, at 1290. This is of
particular concern because, when not taking the drugs, the sex offender “will not have
the willpower to control his deviant sexual behavior.” Rebish, supra, at 517. Further,
in states with chemical castration laws, the decision to administer the procedure is not
left up to the defendant. Rather, these laws often mandate court-ordered chemical
castration for repeat sex offenders. William Winslade, T. Howard Stone, Michele
Smith-Bell & Denise M. Webb, Castrating Pedophiles Convicted of Sex Offenses Against
Children: New Treatment or Old Punishment?, 51 SMU L. REV. 349, 376-81 (1998)
[hereinafter Winslade et al.]. Experts claim that deterrence of future sexual offenses
depends significantly on whether the sex offender understands that what he did was
wrong and whether he has volunteered for the procedure. Peters, supra note 16, at
313.
31
Rebish, supra note 30, at 517; Winslade et al., supra note 30, at 369
(discussing the details of surgical castration).
32
Winslade et al., supra note 30, at 369.
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involves a small incision in the scrotum to remove the testes.33
The procedure’s “primary effect is to diminish [the sex
offender]’s physical and emotional ability to respond to sexual
stimuli.”34
Surgical castration has been used successfully by other
Research from these
countries to treat sex offenders.35
countries indicates that the removal of the testes is an effective
method in reducing recidivism rates.36 A 1979 European study
of sex offenders found that the recidivism rate of castrates was
2.3 percent, compared to thirty-nine percent for non-castrates.37
Still another study indicates that only three percent of
surgically castrated offenders committed a subsequent sex
offense, while members of the non-castrate control group had a
forty-six percent recidivism rate.38 These studies provide
strong evidence that surgical castration is an effective method
of deterring sex offenders.
Proponents of the procedure argue that surgical
castration is minimally invasive because it is not major surgery
and is often performed on an outpatient basis.39 Further, the
primary advantage of surgical castration to other forms of
punishment is in its permanence. In fact, there is no risk that
offenders will manipulate the procedure as they could with
drug therapy40 and this produces long-lasting results.41

33
Kris W. Druhm, A Welcome Return to Draconia: California Penal Law §
645, The Castration of Sex Offenders and the Constitution, 61 ALB. L. REV. 285, 294
(1997).
34
Rebish, supra note 30, at 515 (discussing the effectiveness of surgical
castration).
35
Surgical castration has been used by many European countries, including
Denmark and Germany, and studies show that those countries have drastically
reduced recidivism rates compared to sex offenders who were not surgically castrated.
Winslade et al., supra note 30, at 370, 372. See also Stacy Russell, Castration of Repeat
Sexual Offenders: An International Comparative Analysis, 19 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 425,
442-47 (1997) (surveying surgical castration legislation in European countries).
36
Amy Dorsett, Castration Success Considered, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESSNEWS, May 8, 2005, at 1B (“Surgical castration, when used in conjunction with other
forms of therapy, can dramatically reduce sexual predators’ rates of re-offending.”).
37
Jodi Berlin, Chemical Castration of Sex Offenders: “A Shot in the Arm”
Towards Rehabilitation, 19 WHITTIER L. REV. 169, 179 (1997) (discussing a study of the
effects of castration on sex offenders in Germany).
38
Winslade et al., supra note 30, at 371 (discussing another study in
Germany of surgically castrated sex offenders).
39
Druhm, supra note 33, at 295.
40
Hicks, supra note 25, at 646.
41
Winslade et al., supra note 30, at 353.
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Others argue that surgical castration is a fitting
punishment for heinous sexual crimes.42 An ardent supporter
of surgical castration, Texas district court judge Michael T.
In 1992,
McSpadden, subscribes to this justification.43
McSpadden presided over the case of Steven Allen Butler, who
sexually assaulted44 a thirteen-year-old girl while he was still
on probation for fondling a seven-year-old girl in 1989.45 Butler
volunteered to be surgically castrated in exchange for a lighter
sentence46 and McSpadden agreed.47 While surgical castration
is still only rarely used in the United States to respond to sex
offender activity, there have been recent indications that the
procedure is becoming more acceptable to society as a way to
punish sex offenders.

42

Id.
See Michael T. McSpadden, Op-Ed., Conventional Therapy Doesn’t Stop
Sexual Predators. A Simple Surgical Procedure Will, TEX. LAW., June 30, 1997, at 22.
44
Under Texas law, a person commits sexual assault on a child when the
person intentionally or knowingly:
43

(A) causes the penetration of the anus or female sexual organ of a child by
any means;
(B) causes the penetration of the mouth of a child by the sexual organ of the
actor;
(C) causes the sexual organ of a child to contact or penetrate the mouth,
anus, or sexual organ of another person, including the actor;
(D) causes the anus of a child to contact the mouth, anus, or sexual organ of
another person, including the actor; or
(E) causes the mouth of a child to contact the anus or sexual organ of another
person, including the actor.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(a)(2) (2005).
45
Robert Crowe, Castration no Cure for Pedophilia: Drugs, Surgery May
Temper Drive, but Sexual Interest Won’t “Normalize,” HOUS. CHRON., May 10, 2005, at
B1.
46
Peters, supra note 16, at 307 (“In March, 1992, Steven Allen Butler, an
accused rapist, asked a Texas District Judge to punish him via castration rather than
imprisonment.”).
47
Crowe, supra note 45. However, the surgery never took place due to public
opposition. Kari A. Vanderzyl, Castration as an Alternative to Incarceration: An
Impotent Approach to the Punishment of Sex Offenders, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 107, 107
(1994) (“In March of 1992, Steven Allen Butler . . . requested that [Judge McSpadden]
order surgical castration rather than sentencing him to prison. Judge McSpadden
initially assented to the request, but ultimately withdrew approval in the wake of
national publicity and protests by civil libertarians. Physicians in the area refused to
perform the operation, and even Butler found himself reconsidering his unusual
request.”). See also John Makeig & Julie Mason, Butler’s Family Relieved: Controversy
Kills Castration Plan: Physicians won’t Do Procedure on Accused Child Rapist, HOUS.
CHRON., Mar. 17, 1992, at A1.
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State Legislation and Surgical Castration

Texas is currently one of a few states that have passed
legislation explicitly allowing surgical castration.48 On May 21,
1997, then Governor George W. Bush signed into law a bill
entitled Orchiectomy for Certain Sex Offenders.49 The bill
provides that prison inmates over the age of twenty-one “who
have been twice convicted for indecency, sexual assault, or
aggravated sexual assault involving a child younger than
seventeen [may]…undergo surgical castration.”50 The offender
must submit to a mental health examination before it can be
performed.51
The legislation expressly forbids judges and the parole
board from requiring defendants to be surgically castrated.52
Instead, the offender must volunteer for surgical castration.53
Notably, the legislation is entirely devoid of any penal objective
and the state is not allowed to offer reduced sentencing or
probation in lieu of sentencing to induce sex offenders to
volunteer for the procedure.54 This might explain why only a
few Texas inmates have volunteered to have the surgery since
the procedure became available in 1997.55 Without the promise

48
Other states that allow for surgical castration include California and
Montana. See generally Winslade et al., supra note 30. In 1999, the Oklahoma
legislature considered a bill that would allow surgical castration for convicted sex
offenders, but “[e]ven its most ardent supporters in the House believe it is
unconstitutional because it would impose cruel and unusual punishment.” Tim Talley,
Politically Charged Legislation, THE JOURNAL RECORD (Okla. City), Mar. 16, 1999,
available
at
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4182/is_19990316/ai_
n10125190. However, Oklahoma senators passed legislation to give judges the option
of sentencing sex offenders to chemical castration or surgical castration.
John
Griener, Senate Approves Castration of Sex Offenders, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Mar. 11,
1999, at 8.
49
Associated Press, Bush Signs Child Molester Castration Bill, FORTH
WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, May 21, 1997, at 6 (reporting the signing of TEX. GOV’T CODE
ANN. § 501.061 (2006)).
50
Winslade et al., supra note 30, at 385 (describing the Texas legislation).
51
Id. (“Additionally, a psychiatrist and a psychologist who have experience in
treating sex offenders must evaluate the inmate . . .”).
52
Id.
53
Id. (“There are several provisions in [the Texas bill] that . . . are clearly
intended to ensure that surgical castration is a voluntary, non-coercive, and clearly
therapeutic undertaking.”).
54
Id.
55
Dorsett, supra note 36; Robert Tharp, Molester is Judged Threat to Dallas:
Pedophile Jones to Remain under House Arrest Indefinitely, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
June 17, 2005, at 1B. “The first castration [occurred] in December 2001. The other
[two] took place in March 2004.” Crowe, supra note 45. “[Texas] officials will not
release the names of the three who [opted for] the procedure.” Id. However, notorious
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of reduced incarceration, sex offenders are less willing to
undergo the procedure.
A number of states have considered or are now
considering following Texas and enacting surgical castration
laws. In Minnesota, a group of legislators proposed that
serious sex offenders should be subject to court-ordered
The legislation
castration, either surgical or chemical.56
received significant public support. A 1991 poll found that
fifty-six percent of the public support surgical castration of
repeat sex offenders.57
In Alabama, Rep. Steve Hurst pre-filed a bill in
September 2005 that would allow persons over the age of
twenty-one who are convicted of sex offenses against a child
younger than twelve to be surgically castrated before gaining
their release from the Department of Corrections.58 Hurst
introduced an amendment in 2005 providing for surgical
castration that passed in the House, but later withdrew it
because of concerns that the amendment could be
unconstitutional.59 His new bill was scheduled to be considered
in the 2006 legislative session.60
Notably, in most states that allow chemical castration,
surgical castration is often an option for the sex offender.61 In
California, Florida, and Montana, states which have chemical
castration laws, a defendant may also voluntarily undergo
surgical castration.62 The Florida legislation places a premium
on the sex offender’s consent to the procedure. In emphasizing
the requirement that the defendant must consent to surgical
castration, the law refers to language used to describe when
waivers of constitutional rights are valid. The law provides
that sex offenders may request surgical castration only if their
child molester Larry Don McQuay admitted that he is one of three to have undergone
surgical castration. Dorsett, supra note 36. See also discussion infra Part I.B.
56
Conrad deFiebre, Bill Proposes Castration for Some Sex Offenders, STAR
TRIBUNE (Minneapolis, Minn.), Feb. 18, 2005, at 4B.
57
Id.
58
John Davis & Jannell McGrew, Alabama Lawmakers Line up Crusades for
Next Session, MONTGOMERY ADVISER (Ala.), Sept. 6, 2005, at A1.
59
Id. See also Chandler, supra note 23 (“Some House members reluctantly
agreed to remove language that would have required mandatory surgical castration for
sex offenders convicted of crimes against children under 12. [Attorney General] King
and some lawmakers said they feared the castration provision would make the bill
unconstitutional because of inhumane punishment.”).
60
Davis & McGrew, supra note 58.
61
Winslade et al., supra note 30, at 377, 381 (discussing state chemical
castration bills, some of which also allow surgical castration).
62
Id. at 383.
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consent is “intelligent, knowing, and voluntary.”63 Based on
this language, it appears that involuntary or court-mandated
surgical castration is more of a concern to states than when the
defendant volunteers for the procedure.
B.

A Growing Number of Sex Offenders Have Volunteered
for Surgical Castration When Reduced Sentencing is an
Incentive

A number of sex offenders have chosen to undergo
surgical castration.64 Sex offenders who volunteer for surgical
castration often do so because they believe their chances of an
early release from prison will increase and the likelihood of reoffending will decrease. In these cases, courts must determine
whether the procedure is an effective substitute to the more
traditional punishment of prolonged incarceration.
If the court considers the procedure an effective
substitute, the sex offender might gain his release from prison
or a lighter prison sentence. Of paramount consideration is
whether the sex offender is likely to commit more sex crimes.
A number of courts have granted sex offenders their freedom
for undergoing the procedure or given drastically reduced
sentences.65
Jim Elkins, a former baseball coach in Bossier,
Louisiana, pled guilty to three counts of fondling juveniles in
63

Id. (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.0235).
Guy Ashley, Sex Offender at ASH is Set for Castration: Greg Grant is
Convinced Surgery Will Bring a Cure for the Fantasies That Have Ailed Him; The
Procedure Puts Him at the Center of Decades-old Controversy, THE TRIBUNE (San Luis
Obispo, Cal.), Aug. 29, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 13556669 (“Greg Grant is
scheduled for castration this morning, convinced that [it is] a cure for the deviant
sexual fantasies that have ailed him for decades”); Dorsett, supra note 36 (Larry Don
McQuay, “who claimed to have molested more than 200 children and animals, was
granted his wish of surgical castration within the last year by the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice”); Monte Morin, Graduate of Sex Offender Program is Released, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 14, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 19749979 (stating that “[i]n an effort to
win his freedom, [Brian] DeVries underwent voluntary chemical and surgical
castration”); Tharp, supra note 55 (stating that David Wayne Jones elected to undergo
surgical castration as his parole date approached); Terry Vau Dell, Trial Begins in
Molester’s Bid for Freedom/Castration, OROVILLE MERCURY REGISTER (Cal.), Sept. 2,
2005 (LexisNexis) (stating that Bruce Clotfelter underwent voluntary surgical
castration after he was released on parole for a prior conviction but arrested a few
months later when he was found near elementary schools); Brian Vernellis, Keeping
Sexual Predators out of Youth Sports, THE TIMES (Shreveport, La.), June 26, 2005
(Lexis Nexis) (“Jim Elkins, a former Bossier Police Jury president and longtime Bossier
Dixie baseball coach, pleaded guilty to three counts of fondling juveniles in 1997. He
volunteered for surgical castration and is serving a 25-year sentence.”).
65
See infra Part I.B.
64
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1997 and volunteered for surgical castration as part of the plea
bargain.66 After learning that Elkins had been surgically
castrated, the judge sentenced Elkins to twenty-five years in
prison.67 The judge admitted that if Elkins had not been
castrated, he would have imposed the maximum penalty of
forty-five years in prison.68
Brian DeVries served an eight-year prison sentence for
He became California’s first
molesting nine young boys.69
sexually violent offender to receive treatment at Atascadero
State Hospital70 where he underwent seven years of intensive
psychiatric treatment.71 In an effort to win his freedom,
DeVries also underwent voluntary surgical castration in 2001.72
DeVries spent one year of strict monitoring that a state court
judge called severe and extreme supervision.73 In September
2004, the judge graduated DeVries from the state treatment
program and granted him unconditional release.74 The judge
stated that surgical castration and time spent in the treatment
program meant DeVries was no longer a danger to the public75
and pointed to the fact that DeVries was not aroused by
deviant pornography during treatment.76
Larry Don McQuay is one of the few sex offenders in
Texas known to have been surgically castrated. He molested
more than 200 children and animals.77 McQuay’s first prison
sentence for child molestation came in 1990 for a term of eight
years.78 But a jury again indicted him in 1996 on three new
charges for which he was convicted and sentenced to twenty
years.79 In 1996, McQuay waged a public campaign to be

66

Vernellis, supra note 64.
Id.
68
The judge also stated that “[t]here’s no way I can make you be
castrated. . . . If you plea and don’t get castrated, [it could mean] 45 years.”
Briefly/Nation, THE HERALD SUN (Durham, N.C.), Aug. 9, 1998, at A9.
69
Morin, supra note 64; Alan Gathright, Judge Declares Molester Free to
Leave, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 14, 2004, at A1.
70
Alan Gathright, supra note 69.
71
Morin, supra note 64.
72
Id.; Gathright, supra note 69.
73
Gathright, supra note 69.
74
Morin, supra note 64.
75
Gathright, supra note 69.
76
Id.
77
Dorsett, supra note 36.
78
Id.
79
Id.
67
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surgically castrated80 because he believed it would prevent him
from committing future sexual assaults.81 McQuay’s case
pushed Texas to allow surgical castration of repeat sex
offenders under the 1997 Texas Bill.82 Finally, in 2004, the
Texas Department of Criminal Justice granted his request for
surgical castration.83 In May 2005, the court released McQuay
from prison for good behavior.84 These cases suggest that
voluntary surgical castration can not only convince courts that
the offender is less likely to re-offend, but can also be an
effective punishment of sex offender activity.
II.

SURGICAL CASTRATION AND CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT

Despite some acceptance and positive findings, surgical
castration remains rare and is not widely supported in the
United States.85 In fact, one court has held, and others have
intimated, that surgical castration is cruel and unusual
punishment.86 With the possibility that more states will enact
legislation allowing surgical castration or courts will confront
more cases where the defendant volunteers for the procedure,

80

Id.
Crowe, supra note 45.
82
Dorsett, supra note 36. Interestingly, McQuay’s case came only two years
after public outrage over Steven Allen Butler’s request for surgical castration. See
infra Part I (discussing Steven Allen Butler and his request for the procedure).
McQuay’s request did not produce the same opposition and, in fact, led to public
pressure on Texas to allow the procedure, mainly because McQuay’s request was based
on his belief that he would continue to re-offend if he was not castrated. Druhm, supra
note 33, at 291-92 (discussing McQuade’s case).
83
Dorsett, supra note 36.
84
Id.
85
Larry Helm Spalding, Florida’s 1997 Chemical Castration Law: A Return
to the Dark Ages, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 117, 121 (1998). See also Besharov & Vachhs,
supra note 30 (“Surgical castration has never been very popular in this
country . . . . Although many castrated men may be capable of intercourse, the limited
research that exists suggests that the repeat-offense rate is low. On humanitarian and
civil liberties grounds, however, most experts now oppose the procedure and it is
unlikely that many courts will turn to it as an alternative to incarceration”); Druhm,
supra note 33, at 296 (“Despite the evidence indicating its effectiveness, surgical
castration as a treatment is not widely accepted, especially in America”); Rebish, supra
note 30, at 523 (“Surgical castration of sexual offenders has not been well received in
American courts.”). But see deFiebre, supra note 56 (“A 1991 Star Tribune Minnesota
Poll found support among 56 percent of the public for surgical castration of repeat sex
offenders”).
86
State v. Brown, 326 S.E.2d 410, 412 (1985) (holding that surgical
castration is a form of mutilation and, therefore, cruel and unusual punishment under
state law). See infra Part II.B.
81
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courts must consider whether this type of punishment is
constitutional under the Eighth Amendment.
A.

History and Purpose of the Eighth Amendment

The Eighth Amendment provides that “[e]xcessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted.”87 In Trop v. Dulles,88 the
Supreme Court observed that the Eighth Amendment
protection is aimed at preserving “nothing less than the dignity
of man. While the State has the power to punish, the
Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised
within the limits of civilized standards.”89 This articulation
describes the purpose and spirit of the amendment.
The Court has established certain criteria to determine
when a punishment violates the Eighth Amendment.90 First, a
court must determine whether the punishment is inherently
cruel. This is done by examining “objective indicia that reflect
the public attitude toward a given sanction.”91 The analysis
must consider that the Amendment draws its meaning “from
the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.”92
The punishment must not be unacceptable to society.93
Whether a punishment conforms to society’s contemporary
standards of decency depends on “whether people who were
fully informed as to the purposes of the penalty and its
liabilities would find the penalty shocking, unjust, and
unacceptable.”94 A society that once considered a particular
punishment acceptable may later consider it indecent and,
therefore, a violation of the Eighth Amendment.95 Similarly, a
punishment that might have been indecent decades ago might
be appropriate today.
87

U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
89
Id. at 100.
90
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976); See also Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier,
Let’s Make a Deal: Waiving the Eighth Amendment by Selecting a Cruel and Unusual
Punishment, 32 CONN. L. REV. 615, 625 (2000) (discussing the test created by Gregg).
91
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
92
Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.
93
Hicks, supra note 25, at 658 (“In determining whether a punishment falls
within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment ban, the Supreme Court has used
several criteria, including whether the punishment is . . . unacceptable to society”).
94
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 361 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
95
Id. at 329-30.
88
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Second, a punishment must not exceed what is
necessary to accomplish the state’s legitimate aims.96 This
means that the punishment must be commensurate with the
offense for which it is imposed rather than be grossly out of
proportion to the severity of the crime.97 Also, the punishment
must not be inflicted arbitrarily.98
The Supreme Court has held certain kinds of
punishments to be unconstitutional. It has found extreme
physical suffering to be cruel and unusual because it is
disproportionate to the crime.99 The Court has also considered
severe mental pain cruel and unusual punishment even though
there may be “no physical mistreatment.”100 In dicta, the Court
has mentioned that beheadings, burning alive, and emboweling
would all violate the Eighth Amendment.101
While the Court has not addressed the particular issue
of whether surgical castration imposed as part of a sentence
would violate the Eighth Amendment, there is language in
lower court Eighth Amendment cases that intimate that
castration would be unconstitutional. In Whitten v. State,102 a
jury convicted the defendant of assault and battery and
sentenced him to six months in prison. On appeal to the
Supreme Court of Georgia, the defendant claimed that his
sentence was cruel and unusual.103 Concerning whether the
punishment was cruel and unusual, the court observed that the
clause “was, doubtless, intended to prohibit the barbarities of
quartering, hanging in chains, [and] castration”.104 The court
affirmed the punishment, stating that “the object of
punishment is to prevent crime.”105
In Davis v. Berry,106 the Iowa Board of Parole ordered
that a prison inmate receive a vasectomy, pursuant to a state
statute requiring the procedure for repeat felons.107 The court
compared vasectomy to castration and observed that castration
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107

Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910).
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (citing Weems, 217 U.S. at 381).
Weems, 217 U.S. at 370.
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135 (1878).
Whitten v. Georgia, 47 Ga. 297 (1872).
Id.
Id. at 301.
Id.
Davis v. Berry, 216 F. 413 (S.D. Iowa 1914).
Id. at 417.
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is more severe and that, for each procedure, “[t]he physical
suffering may not be so great, but that is not the only test of
cruel punishment; the humiliation, the degradation, the mental
suffering are always present and known by all the public, and
will follow him wheresoever he may go.”108 The court held that
the procedure was unconstitutional on cruel and unusual
punishment grounds.109
Aside from judicial opinions on the subject, there is a
plethora of scholarly articles suggesting that surgical
castration would not pass constitutional scrutiny. These
arguments focus on the nature of the procedure, that it is
permanent and disfiguring, and that surgical castration is
more akin to other physical forms of punishment that courts
consider unconstitutional or society finds repugnant.110
B.

The Leading State Decision on the Constitutionality of
Surgical Castration: State v. Brown

The only court to have ruled on the constitutionality of
surgical castration of sex offenders is the Supreme Court of
South Carolina in State v. Brown.111 In that case, three
defendants committed a brutal gang rape.112 Instead of going to
trial, the defendants pleaded guilty to first-degree criminal
sexual conduct.113 At sentencing, the trial judge ordered that
each defendant be imprisoned for thirty years, the maximum

108

Id. at 416.
Id. at 417.
110
Druhm, supra note 33, at 315 (“Surgical castration is very severe and
unlikely to pass any Eighth Amendment analysis because it is permanent and
disfiguring.”); Stadler, supra note 17, at 1322 (“There is little question that actual
castration would be considered a violation of the Eighth Amendment.”).
111
State v. Brown, 326 S.E.2d 410 (1985).
112
Keesling, supra note 30, at 390 n.87 (discussing the facts of State v. Brown,
326 S.E.2d 410 (1985)).
113
Brown, 326 S.E.2d at 410. Under South Carolina law,
109

(1) A person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree if the actor
engages in sexual battery with the victim and if any one or more of the
following circumstances are proven:
(a) The actor uses aggravated force to accomplish sexual battery.
(b) The victim submits to sexual battery by the actor under circumstances
where the victim is also the victim of forcible confinement, kidnapping,
robbery, extortion, burglary, housebreaking, or any other similar offense or
act.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-652 (2005).
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sentence under South Carolina law at that time.114 The judge,
however, went on to state a condition of probation that could
reduce the sentence.115 The defendants could receive suspended
sentences and probation imposed for five years if they agreed to
surgical castration.116 The defendants initially appealed the
sentence but later withdrew their appeals117 and defendant
Brown sought a writ of mandamus to compel the execution of
the suspended sentence.118
On appeal, the Supreme Court of South Carolina ruled
that voluntary surgical castration as a condition of a suspended
sentence and probation was unconstitutional under the state
constitution.119 While the court recognized that a trial judge
has wide discretion in imposing conditions on sentences and
probation, it emphasized the fact that a judge may not impose
or accept conditions that are against public policy.120 In
determining public policy, the court looked to the state
constitution, statutes and judicial decisions,121 and determined
Therefore, it
that castration is a form of mutilation.122
constituted cruel and unusual punishment.123
Given that the procedure would be cruel and unusual
under the South Carolina constitution, the court rejected that
the defendant could waive this constitutional right. The court
stated that, “notwithstanding that the defendant accepted the
condition, thereby attempting to waive his right to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment, the condition was void because
a state ‘cannot impose conditions which are illegal and void as
against public policy.’”124 A defendant “may not waive the
constitutional ban [on cruel and unusual punishment] and thus
empower the state to impose a punishment that it is otherwise
114

Hicks, supra note 25, at 652 n.101.
Druhm, supra note 33, at 289 (“No South Carolina statute required
castration at the time; instead, the judge was using his discretion to suspend sentences
subject to court-imposed conditions.”).
116
Brown, 326 S.E.2d at 410.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id. at 412. The South Carolina state constitution is similar to the United
States Constitution. It states that: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor shall
excessive fines be imposed, nor shall cruel, nor corporal, nor unusual punishment be
inflicted, nor shall witnesses be unreasonably detained.” S.C. CONST. art. I, § 15
(2005).
120
Brown, 326 S.E.2d at 411.
121
Id. at 412.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Id. at 411.
115
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forbidden to inflict.”125 Notably, the court’s argument was not
that courts allowing defendants a choice is unconstitutional,
but rather that conditioning parole on an impermissible
alternative to incarceration is unconstitutional.126
State v. Brown does not involve a similar set of facts to
Keith Fremin’s case. Fremin is a repeat sex offender and
molested children.127 However, the case suggests that, even if a
defendant decides of his own volition to undergo the procedure,
surgical castration might still implicate the Eighth
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment, making
waiver of this constitutional protection complicated for
courts.128
III.

APPLICATION OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT: VOLUNTARY
SURGICAL CASTRATION CONSTITUTES CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT

The most likely constitutional challenge surgical
castration faces is under the Eighth Amendment. Surgical
castration evokes aversion from people because it compromises
a defendant’s bodily integrity by permanently altering the
body.129 This conflicts with the idea that “[t]here should be an
overwhelming presumption against having the long arm of
government touch the human body . . . in intimate ways.”130 It

125

Richard J. Bonnie, The Dignity of the Condemned, 74 VA. L. REV. 1363,
1371 (1988).
126
Hicks, supra note 25, at 653 (“This decision should not be misinterpreted
as holding that allowing a defendant to choose between castration and a substantial
prison sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. What the court found to be
cruel and unusual was the castration of criminals, not the allowance of a choice.”).
127
See discussion supra Introduction.
128
But see Briley v. California, 564 F.2d 849, 852 (9th Cir. 1977) (discussing
the case in which a convicted child molester was allowed to plead to a lesser charge
with a suspended sentence if he voluntarily submitted to surgical castration, which he
did).
129
Druhm, supra note 33, at 315 (“Surgical castration is very severe and
unlikely to pass any Eighth Amendment analysis because it is permanent and
disfiguring.”); Miller, supra note 30, at 178-79 (“There have continued to be attempts to
use surgical castration to reduce inappropriate sexual behavior; however, because the
procedure is irreversible, because the clinical evidence demonstrates that it is not
always effective, and because reversible medications are now widely available, it has
largely fallen into disfavor.”); Stadler, supra note 17, at 1322 (“There is little question
that actual castration would be considered a violation of the Eighth Amendment.”).
130
Richard Lacayo, Sentences Inscribed on Flesh: The Prospect of Castration
for a Sex Offender Raises Questions About When the Law Can Invade the Body, TIME,
Mar. 23, 1992, at 54 (quoting Laurence Tribe, a Harvard Law School professor).
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also conflicts with society’s values of physical autonomy and
personal privacy.131
Opponents of the procedure argue that surgically
castrating sex offenders is nothing more than bodily mutilation
and a return to a time when hangings and beheadings were
acceptable punishments.132 These arguments suggest that
surgical castration will have a difficult time passing
constitutional scrutiny under the Supreme Court’s Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence.133
A.

Voluntary Surgical Castration is Punishment

Some scholars have suggested that castration might
pass constitutional scrutiny if it is prescribed as treatment
To determine whether
rather than as punishment.134
something is punishment rather than treatment, many courts
have used a four-part test established in Rennie v. Klein as a
useful guide.135 Under that test, a court must consider whether
surgical castration has any therapeutic value, is recognized
and accepted medical practice, “is . . . part of an ongoing
psychotherapeutic program,” and has unreasonably harsh
adverse effects.136 If surgical castration meets all four prongs,
then it is considered treatment rather than punishment.137
While surgical castration may have therapeutic value
and may be imposed as part of an ongoing psychotherapeutic
program, a court would consider the procedure punishment
rather than treatment because it fails the second prong of the
test. The procedure is not recognized as an acceptable medical
treatment for sex offenders in this country.138 Further, a court
may find that the adverse effects of surgical castration are
unreasonably harsh. Side effects of surgical castration are
permanent and include “excessive perspiration and blushing,
131
Spalding, supra note 85, at 127 (discussing the importance of requiring a
sex offender’s consent to chemical castration).
132
See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
133
Id.
134
Winslade et al., supra note 30, at 387 (“Used therapeutically, surgical
castration may very well survive a constitutional ‘cruel and unusual punishment’
challenge”).
135
Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D. N.J. 1978).
136
Id. at 1143; Rebish, supra note 30, at 527-28.
137
Rebish, supra note 30, at 527-28.
138
Id. at 528 (“First, surgical castration fails the second prong of the [Rennie]
test because it is not a medically acceptable treatment for criminals in the United
States.”).
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loss of hair both on the body and face, increase in body weight,
and softening of the skin.”139
Where a sex offender volunteers for surgical castration,
the issue is simpler. In this situation, the defendant knows
that if he volunteers for the procedure pursuant to a plea
bargain or in post-trial sentencing, his sentence will likely be
reduced.140 When the judge accepts surgical castration and
where the procedure is a condition for a reduced sentence, the
procedure becomes part of that reduced sentence. Therefore, it
qualifies as punishment and is subject to constitutional
scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.
B.

Voluntary Surgical Castration is Cruel and Unusual

Surgical castration would fail most prongs of the Eighth
Amendment’s test to determine what punishment is cruel and
unusual. First, a court would find the procedure to be
inherently cruel for a number of reasons. The procedure
involves permanent change to the body141 and eliminates the
ability of the offender to procreate.142 The Supreme Court has
held procreation to be a fundamental right.143 This severe
consequence of surgical castration renders the procedure
inherently cruel.
Society’s support of using the procedure to punish sex
offenders is also questionable. Physical torture and mutilation,
once accepted in American society, are no longer so. Since the
operation involves injury to the body, this would shock the
conscience.144 Further, the criminal justice system is no longer
primarily focused on retribution in the form of an eye-for-an
eye.145 The public would not support surgical castration as a
139

Id. at 515.
Nancy Jean King, Priceless Process: Nonnegotiable Features of Criminal
Litigation, 47 UCLA L. REV. 113, 118 (1999) (stating that a defendant enters into a
plea bargain in exchange for a prosecutor’s “promise to forego or reduce charges against
the defendant . . . and her promise to recommend a more lenient sentence”).
141
William Green, Depo-Provera, Castration, and the Probation of Rape
Offenders: Statutory and Constitutional Issues, 12 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1, 3 (1986)
(stating that surgical castration would shock the conscience because it permanently
mutilates the body).
142
Peter J. Gimino III, Mandatory Chemical Castration for Perpetrators of Sex
Offenses Against Children: Following California’s Lead, 25 PEPP. L. REV. 67, 92 (1997).
143
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
144
Rebish, supra note 30, at 529.
145
MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 11
(Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1975) (“Physical pain, the pain of
the body itself, is no longer the constituent element of the penalty. From being an art
140
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sanction of sexually deviant behavior146 given the nature of
surgical castration and its side effects.147
Second, a court would find surgical castration to be
excessive compared to what is necessary for the state to
accomplish its goals.
Certainly, protecting children and
deterring sex offender activity are legitimate state aims. But
surgical castration would fail this test since there are less
intrusive and traditionally accepted punishment alternatives
available, such as imprisonment and therapy.148 There are also
innovative methods that are available or being tested that are
less intrusive than surgical castration, such as chemical
castration, requiring sex offenders to register with local
communities, and tracking devices.149
Another reason courts would find that surgical
castration is excessive is that research remains inconsistent on
whether surgical castration does more to deter perpetrators
from re-offending than other punishment methods.150 If it were
otherwise, courts might consider the procedure more favorably
under this test, but that is not currently the case.
Surgical castration would also fail the proportionality
prong of the test. Surgical castration is an irreversible
procedure and has numerous and long-lasting adverse side

of unbearable sensations punishment has become an economy of suspended rights.”);
Miller, supra note 30, at 178 (“As physical torture and mutilation lost favor as
legitimate methods of punishment in U.S. law, the retributive justification for
castration virtually disappeared”).
146
Rebish, supra note 30, at 529.
147
Side effects include “excessive perspiration and blushing, [and] loss of hair
both on the body and face.” Id. at 515. Unlike with chemical castration, these side
effects are permanent. Id.
148
Green, supra note 141, at 22 (“Surgical castration would fail the . . . test for
cruel and unusual punishment because the less intrusive alternatives of imprisonment
or psychotherapy are available.”).
149
One attempt to deter sex offender activity requires sex offenders to register
with the local communities in which they settle after completing their prison sentence.
Granlund, supra note 23, at 205-06 (discussing Megan’s Law, which requires a state to
release information to the public about a registered sex offender).
A recent
development in imposing harsher penalties for sex offenders involves requiring
offenders to wear global positioning ankle bracelets for a decade or more after they get
out of prison. Chandler, supra note 23. Alabama’s legislature enacted this program
and Florida followed by “requiring certain offenders to wear [the bracelets] for life.
New Jersey [has] approved a two-year pilot program.” Id. Other states are currently
experimenting with the idea. Id.
150
Miller, supra note 30, at 178-79 (‘There have continued to be attempts to
use surgical castration to reduce inappropriate sexual behavior; however, because the
procedure is irreversible, because the clinical evidence demonstrates that it is not
always effective . . . it has largely fallen into disfavor.”)
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effects.151 “[P]hysical side effects include excessive perspiration
and blushing, loss of hair . . . body weight [gain], and softening
of the skin.”152 Psychological side effects are unclear, but some
research points to increased suicidal tendencies.153 However,
the possibility of a court finding that surgical castration is
disproportionate is less certain than the other prongs of the
test. If one considers that offenders often commit multiple
crimes over a long period of time and that sex crimes leave
deep permanent emotional marks on the victim, a court might
find that the procedure is proportionate to the offense.154
Finally, the last element of an Eighth Amendment
analysis is irrelevant. Since sex offenders would volunteer for
surgical castration, there is no risk that the punishment would
be inflicted arbitrarily. Still, this would not be enough for a
court to uphold surgical castration since the procedure fails the
other elements of the test. Therefore, a court would find that
the procedure is unconstitutional as cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
IV.

WAIVING THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION

While a court is likely to find that surgical castration is
cruel and unusual punishment, a court should allow a sex
offender who volunteers for the procedure to waive the Eighth
Amendment protection.
So long as the waiver is done
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and “with sufficient
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences,”155 the defendant’s choice is valid. Voluntary
waiver means that there is “no physical or mental coercion”
that prompts the defendant to waive the right.156 Even though

151

Rebish, supra note 30, at 515.
Id. (listing the side effects of surgical castration).
153
Druhm, supra note 33, at 296 (“Furthermore, some research suggests that
surgically castrated men may be more likely to commit suicide following the
operation.”).
154
Kenneth B. Fromson, Beyond an Eye for an Eye: Castration as an
Alternative Sentencing Measure, 11 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 311, 321 (1994) (“[W]hen
one considers the seriousness of sexual abuse, and the suffering that victims are
subjected to as a result of sexual abuse, castration should not be seen as a punishment
disproportionate to the offense.”).
155
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
156
Beckman, supra note 24, at 894 (arguing that sex offenders should have
the opportunity to waive constitutional protections).
152
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a defendant may be motivated by the possibility of a reduced
sentence, such a waiver may still be voluntary.157
The Supreme Court has recognized in numerous cases
that a defendant may waive fundamental constitutional
rights.158 When a defendant enters a guilty plea, he waives a
number of constitutionally protected rights.159 By not going to
trial, the defendant waives his right to a trial by jury and his
right to see and confront witnesses.160 If a defendant is an
American citizen and pleads guilty to a crime, he might waive
his right to vote.161
Waiver of the Eighth Amendment protection pursuant
to a plea bargain raises thornier issues than waivers of
procedural protections.162 Unlike with other constitutional
rights, the Eighth Amendment analysis is based largely on
current societal standards.163 “The [E]ighth [A]mendment
represents a societal interest above and beyond that of the
individual.”164 The Supreme Court has noted that the Eighth
Amendment is not only intended to protect defendants but
“also expresses a fundamental interest of society in ensuring
that state authority is not used to administer barbaric

157
Id. (citing Brady, 397 U.S. at 751) (arguing that sex offenders should have
the opportunity to waive constitutional protections). See also Hicks, supra note 25, at
651 (“The mere fact that the accused must face the consequences of his crime does not
make consent invalid. The pressure in making a decision alone does not vitiate a
voluntary act or admission if state actors do not impose any coercion or duress.”).
158
For example, the Court has recognized the ability to waive the right to
counsel. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 417-18 (1979). See also Linda E.
Carter, Maintaining Systemic Integrity in Capital Cases: The Use of Court-Appointed
Counsel to Present Mitigating Evidence When the Defendant Advocates Death, 55 TENN.
L. REV. 95, 128 (1987) (“Limits on an individual defendant’s ability to waive
constitutional rights are warranted when society’s interests are balanced against those
of the defendant”).
159
Hicks, supra note 25, at 652 (“A defendant who enters such a plea
simultaneously waives several constitutional rights, including his privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination, his right to trial by jury, and his right to confront his
accusers.” (quoting McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 495, 466 (1969))).
160
Kirchmeier, supra note 90, at 630.
161
Id.
162
Id. at 646 (“The justification for disallowing waiver of constitutional rights
applies with more force where the issue involves a barbaric punishment instead of a
procedural violation.”).
163
Id. at 643.
Arguments against a defendant waiving the Eighth
Amendment focus on the strong societal interest in this constitutional protection. See
id. at 617-18.
164
Carter, supra note 158, at 144-45.
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punishments.”165 Society has a stake in protecting defendants
from cruel and unusual punishment.166
Typically, debates involving waiver of the Eighth
Amendment protection arise in cases involving a defendant
who accepts the death penalty without going to trial or who,
having been sentenced to death, waives his right to appeal and
“volunteer” for execution.167 However, the arguments raised in
the death penalty context are also relevant for the purposes of
deciding when a sex offender should be allowed to waive the
Eighth Amendment protection. Those opposed to waiver of the
Eighth Amendment argue that the Amendment is
fundamentally different from other constitutional protections
that a defendant has in the criminal justice process.168 This is
primarily because of the purpose behind the Amendment,
which is to limit the state’s power to inflict punishment on an
individual.169
Further, while some critics recognize that a defendant
has an interest in controlling his defense and deciding his
fate,170 they claim that, from a public policy perspective, the

165

Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1019 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Lenhard v. Wolff, 444 U.S. 807, 811 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(“Society’s independent stake in enforcement of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment cannot be overridden by a defendant’s
purported waiver.”).
167
John H. Blume, Killing the Willing: “Volunteers,” Suicide and Competency,
103 MICH. L. REV. 939, 939-40 (2005) (stating that “there have been 885 executions,
106 of which, including the first, involved ‘volunteers,’ or inmates who waived their
appeals and permitted the death sentence to be carried out.” (footnotes omitted));
Anthony J. Casey, Maintaining the Integrity of Death: An Argument for Restricting a
Defendant’s Right to Volunteer for Execution at Certain Stages in Capital Proceedings,
30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 75, 76 (2002); Tim Kaine, Capital Punishment and the Waiver of
Sentence Review, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 483, 487 (1983) (“So-called ‘voluntary’
executions raise difficult questions in . . . death penalty jurisprudence. Allowing a
defendant to terminate the review of his capital sentence injects a disturbingly
arbitrary element into the infliction of the death penalty.”).
168
See Kirchmeier, supra note 90, at 617. See also Steven A. Blum, Public
Executions: Understanding the “Cruel and Unusual Punishments” Clause, 19 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 413, 451 (1992) (“One may not consent to cruel and unusual punishment.
For example, even if given the choice of punishments between torture and death, the
prisoner could not choose torture.”).
169
Gilmore, 429 U.S. at 1019 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Eighth
Amendment . . . also expresses a fundamental interest of society in ensuring that state
authority is not used to administer barbaric punishments.”); Casey, supra note 167, at
94 (“The rights created by the Eighth Amendment are not merely personal. They are
guarantees to society that the integrity of the criminal justice system will be
maintained.”).
170
Bonnie, supra note 125, at 1366-67 (recognizing that the prisoner has an
interest in controlling his own fate); Casey, supra note 167, at 76 (stating that an
individual has “autonomy interests in controlling her own defense”).
166
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interests of the states must trump the defendant’s interests.171
Prohibiting a capital defendant from waiving the Eighth
Amendment right and essentially choosing death assures
society that no person in a democratic nation will receive such
a punishment without a rigorous process.172
The rights created by the Eighth Amendment are not
simply individual rights. They offer security and assurance to
society of the integrity of the criminal justice system, that
punishments will not be inflicted arbitrarily or with undue
harshness.173 The Eighth Amendment provides society with the
comfort of knowing that the criminal justice system is a fair
one. The Amendment’s goal of ensuring society that it will be
free from cruel and unusual punishments suggests that waiver
of this protection is prohibited when it would undermine this
societal interest.
A.

Societal Interest in the Eighth Amendment is Weak
When Sex Offenders Volunteer for Surgical Castration

While the Eighth Amendment is an important
guarantee against unchecked state powers, the societal interest
in the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is
weak when sex offenders volunteer for surgical castration
pursuant to a plea bargain.174 This situation is significantly
different from defendants in capital cases or inmates on death
row who want to waive their appeals, where the societal
interest is strongest. For this reason, sex offenders who choose
171
Carter, supra note 158, at 144-45; Kirchmeier, supra note 90, at 649 (“In
the Eighth Amendment context, there is generally no benefit for defendants or society
in allowing defendants to be punished in a cruel and unusual manner. In fact, such
punishments would have a detrimental effect on society.”).
172
FOUCAULT, supra note 145, at 217 (“Our society is one not of spectacle, but
of surveillance; . . . it is not that the beautiful totality of the individual is amputated,
repressed, altered by our social order, it is rather that the individual is carefully
fabricated in it”).
173
Gilmore, 429 U.S. at 1019 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“I believe that the
Eighth Amendment not only protects the right of individuals not to be victims of cruel
and unusual punishment, but that it also expresses a fundamental interest of society in
ensuring that state authority is not used to administer barbaric punishments”). See
also Casey, supra note 167, at 94 (“The rights created by the Eighth Amendment are
not merely personal. They are guarantees to society that the integrity of the criminal
justice system will be maintained.”).
174
But see North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 n.11 (1970) (“Our holding
does not mean that a trial judge must accept every constitutionally valid guilty plea
merely because a defendant wishes so to plead. A criminal defendant does not have an
absolute right under the Constitution to have his guilty plea accepted by the
court . . . .”).
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to undergo the procedure should be able to waive the protection
from cruel and unusual punishment.175
First, society’s interest in the Eighth Amendment
protection is diminished when the sex offender volunteers for
surgical castration. The purpose of the prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment expresses “a fundamental
interest of society in ensuring that state authority is not used
to administer barbaric punishments.”176 The Amendment is
also about the dignity of man.177 “[I]nherent in the concept of
human dignity is an assurance that a penalty is not imposed
which offends the dignity and integrity of society.”178 These
arguments presuppose that the state initiates and inflicts the
barbaric punishment on the defendant without his consent.
But when it is the defendant himself who initiates the
procedure and volunteers for surgical castration, this argument
loses strength.
Second, the Eighth Amendment right in the particular
context of sex offender cases is more like other constitutional
rights a defendant may waive, such as the right to trial by
jury,179 because waiver of this right can benefit the defendant.
Waiving trial by jury can spare the defendant and his family
the expense and stress of enduring a public trial.180 Waiving
the Eighth Amendment and volunteering for surgical
castration pursuant to a plea bargain is a similar strategic
move since the defendant hopes to be treated for his deviant
tendencies and receive a more advantageous sentence than
may be expected if he went to trial.181 Viewed in this light,
society’s interest in prohibiting the state from inflicting cruel

175

Fromson, supra note 154, at 335 (“Consequently, if a court finds a
defendant’s request for castration to be reasonable, it could grant the constitutional
waiver of the right to be protected from cruel and unusual punishment.” (footnote
omitted)). But see Gilmore, 429 U.S. at 1018 (White, J., dissenting) (“I believe,
however, that the consent of a convicted defendant in a criminal case does not privilege
a State to impose a punishment otherwise forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.”).
176
Gilmore, 429 U.S. at 1019 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
177
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
178
Carter, supra note 158, at 144.
179
Kaine, supra note 167, at 502 (“Pleas of guilty are the rule in criminal
cases even though such pleas involve waiver of many constitutional rights of the
defendant, including his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, his right to
trial by jury, and right to confront his accusors [sic].” (internal quotes and citation
omitted)).
180
Kirchmeier, supra note 90, at 649.
181
See Hicks, supra note 25, at 652 (discussing the reasons for plea
bargaining).
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and unusual punishment on a criminal defendant is
diminished.
Finally, sex offenders waiving the Eighth Amendment
are justified and less of a concern to society because the harm
sex offenders suffer when they waive the protection is not
comparable to the harm that results when defendants waive
the Eighth Amendment in death penalty cases.182 Sex offenders
are still able to function normally after being surgically
castrated.183 And their motivations in waiving the protection
are to stop committing sex offenses and to gain early release
from prison or a reduced sentence.184
V.

BALANCING THE VARIOUS INTERESTS: WHEN SEX
OFFENDERS MAY WAIVE THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND
VOLUNTEER FOR SURGICAL CASTRATION

Given that society’s interests in the Eighth Amendment
protection is weak in cases where sex offenders volunteer for
surgical castration, a sex offender may waive this right and
consent to an otherwise unconstitutional punishment. But it
does not follow that a judge must accept the waiver as part of a
guilty plea185 or that a state must impose such a punishment for
which a defendant volunteers.186 Castration places the judicial
system in a unique position because judges may be sanctioning
a procedure that some consider an intrusion into one’s right to
bodily integrity.187 This is of particular concern to jurists since
the Supreme Court has dealt with the procedure’s

182

See discussion supra Part IV.
See discussion supra Part I.
184
Hicks, supra note 25, at 652 (discussing the reasons for plea bargaining).
See discussion supra Part I.B.
185
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 n.11 (1970) (“Our holding does
not mean that a trial judge must accept every constitutionally valid guilty plea merely
because a defendant wishes so to plead. A criminal defendant does not have an
absolute right under the Constitution to have his guilty plea accepted by the
court . . . .”).
186
Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1018 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) (“I
believe, however, that the consent of a convicted defendant in a criminal case does not
privilege a State to impose a punishment otherwise forbidden by the Eighth
Amendment.”). See also Bonnie, supra note 125, at 1371 (stating that “it is clear that
[one] may not waive [a] constitutional ban and thus empower the state to impose a
punishment that it is otherwise forbidden to inflict. Similarly, although it is easy to
understand why a rational prisoner might prefer castration to a lengthy penitentiary
sentence, it is unlikely that the state would be permitted to offer such a choice.”).
187
Druhm, supra note 33, at 315 (“Surgical castration is very
severe . . . because it is permanent and disfiguring.”); Spalding, supra note 85, at 127.
183
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constitutionality only in dicta and not through a definitive
ruling.188
Courts must fashion ways to decide when it is
reasonable for sex offenders to choose surgical castration. A
defendant should be able to choose surgical castration when
doing so meets the interests of the defendant, criminal justice
system, and society. Courts should use a balancing test to
determine when the various interests are aligned and waiver of
the Eighth Amendment is permissible.
In sex offender cases, the defendant has an interest in
shaping his own defense and a right to make decisions related
to his physical autonomy.189 The state has an interest in
promoting the integrity of the criminal justice system.190
Finally, the public has an interest in protecting itself from
criminals while also promoting the values of a democratic
society.191 If surgical castration preserves the dignity of the
defendant and furthers the interests of the criminal justice
system and society, then a sex offender should be allowed to
waive the Eighth Amendment protection.
A.

Defendant’s Interests in Waiving the Eighth Amendment
Right

When a defendant enters a plea bargain, he does so
after careful negotiations between his attorney and prosecutors
and after considering his chances at trial.192 A defendant also
enters a plea bargain with the expectation that his punishment
will be more favorable to him than if he had been convicted
after trial.193 This is what induces sex offenders to plead guilty
and volunteer for surgical castration.194 When deciding to
volunteer for surgical castration, a sex offender has a number

188

Spalding, supra note 85, at 131 (discussing Eighth Amendment Supreme
Court cases that mention castration).
189
Casey, supra note 167, at 76 (stating that an individual has “autonomy
interests in controlling her own defense”).
190
See Fromson, supra note 154, at 323.
191
Bonnie, supra note 125, at 1369 (“[S]ociety has an interest, independent of
the prisoner’s own interest, in the integrity of its institutions of criminal punishment
and in the dignity of the processes through which these punishments are carried out.”).
192
Hicks, supra note 25, at 652 (discussing the reasons for plea bargaining).
193
Id. (“In return, the accused receives the certainty of a more advantageous
sentence than may be expected if the accused were to stand trial and be convicted.”).
194
Id.
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of interests.195 These include controlling his defense and his
bodily integrity.
First, in some states, sex offenders face life in prison if
they go to trial and a jury convicts them. In these situations,
the interest in controlling their defense and entering into an
advantageous plea bargain is significant.196 Defendants have
the right to choose options that are more favorable to their case
and to control their own fate.197 They also have an interest in
avoiding the burdens of trial.198 Second, inherent in our legal
and judicial system is respect for autonomy and personal
dignity.199 This suggests that the informed and voluntary
choice of the defendant deserves respect.200
Voluntary surgical castration furthers these interests.
Not only would defendants be able to choose a procedure they
believe will help control their sexually deviant behavior, but
they also would have decision-making power in the plea
bargaining process. This self-determination and freedom to
choose may enhance the dignity of their lives and further the
purpose of the Eighth Amendment.201
B.

Interests of the Criminal Justice System

The state has a legitimate interest in protecting its
citizens, especially the most vulnerable members. Surgical
castration may achieve the goals of the criminal justice system.
These goals are retribution for crime victims, deterrence of
future criminal conduct by the offender and others,
rehabilitation of the offender, and denunciation by society of
195

See discussion supra Part I.B.
Casey, supra note 167, at 76 (stating that there is a “tension between
society’s interest in the appropriate application of the death sentence and an
individual’s autonomy interests in controlling her own defense.”).
197
Bonnie, supra note 125, at 1376 (“[A] prisoner has [the] right to control his
own fate within the constraints established by the law.” (emphasis omitted)).
198
Casey, supra note 167, at 104-05.
199
Id. at 101 (“The respect for autonomy and personal dignity inherent in our
judicial system suggests an interest of the individual in determining whether an
argument will be made on her behalf.”).
200
Blume, supra note 167, at 941 (“Were it not for the fact that the client’s
choice, if unfettered, will result in his death, it would be clear that this is the kind of
ultimate . . . decision that a client is entitled to make for himself . . . . Viewed from the
client-choice vantage point, the only question is whether the client is competent to
make that choice.”); Kaine, supra note 167, at 497 (discussing the rationale for waiver
of a constitutional protection).
201
Blume, supra note 167, at 941 (examining arguments in favor of allowing
death-row inmates to waive their appeals).
196
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the conduct.202 Retribution involves revenge for the harm
which society has suffered due to the criminal act.203
Deterrence is aimed at discouraging and preventing future
criminal activity.204 Rehabilitation is an attempt at reforming
the wrongdoer so that he does not commit more crimes.205 And
denunciation is an expression of society’s condemnation of the
criminal act.206
Surgical castration in sex offender cases accomplishes
the retribution and denunciation goals of the criminal justice
system.207 If the victims accept the offender’s choice of surgical
castration, this creates a sense of retribution and justice.
Surgical castration also allows the community in which the sex
offender committed the heinous acts to denounce his and
similar behavior and reassures the community that the sex
offender will not re-offend.
The procedure may also deter future sex offenses and
help rehabilitate sex offenders. Surgical castration reduces the
recidivism rate for sex offenders.208 It can also prevent the
offender from experiencing the urge to commit sex crimes.
With these results, the offender may re-enter society, “rebuild
family ties, pursue employment,” and become an active
participant in society.209
Further, in the case of Keith Raymond Fremin, the
police Sergeant said Fremin’s castration request and the
twenty-five year sentence handed down so late in his life
(Fremin was fifty-two when the sentence was imposed)
satisfied the department that he posed no future threat.210
When sex offenders like Fremin are surgically castrated and
must serve still lengthy prison sentences, it is unlikely that
202
Fromson, supra note 154, at 323 (discussing the goals of the criminal
justice system).
203
Id. at 323 n.71 (citing WAYNE LAFAVE & AUSTIN SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW
§ 1.5(a)(6) 25 (2d ed. 1986)).
204
Id. (citing JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 5 (1987))
(discussing the goal of deterring crime).
205
Id. (discussing the goal of rehabilitation (citing DRESSLER, at 5)).
206
Id. (discussing the goal of denunciation (citing DRESSLER, at 8)).
207
Id. at 323 (“Castrating sexual offenders would serve both the retributive
and denunciation goals of the criminal justice system because, as a punishment, it
serves as a ‘device for the expression of feelings of resentment, indignation, and
vindication.’” (quoting Lauren J. Abrams, Sexual Offenders and the Use of DepoProvera, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 565, 576 (1985))).
208
See discussion supra Part I.
209
Jason O. Runckel, Abuse It and Lose It: A Look at California’s Mandatory
Chemical Castration Law, 28 PAC. L.J. 547, 591 (1997).
210
Gordon, supra note 2.
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they will commit similar crimes once they gain their release
from prison.
C.

Society’s Interests

Society has dual interests in protecting the individual
integrity of the defendant while appropriately punishing the
offender. The public legitimately wants to protect people from
sex offenders who might commit crimes again and again.211
Because an offender has broken the law, society has an interest
in seeing him punished.212
Surgical castration of sex offenders might meet these
interests. First, surgical castration furthers society’s interest
in protecting the integrity of the defendant. The defendant
himself has made the decision to undergo a medical procedure.
By respecting this decision in the context of the other interests
involved, the defendant’s integrity may be maintained.
Second, surgical castration can give the victims and
community a sense of justice, denunciation, and retribution.213
Statistics reveal that the average sex offender may commit
almost 400 sex crimes.214 Since surgical castration reduces
recidivism rates among sex offenders, public safety is
protected. Further, voluntary surgical castration shows that
the defendant is publicly accepting responsibility for his acts,
admitting guilt, and showing remorse.215 If courts allow sex
offenders to volunteer for surgical castration, society stands to
gain an enormous benefit.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In today’s world, it is clear that incarceration alone is an
insufficient punishment and deterrent for sex offender activity.
Children continue to be molested216 and society is constantly
seeking ways of preventing sex offenders from committing

211
See discussion supra Part I.B. Larry Don McQuay told a reporter on the
television news program 20/20 that “‘we just bide our time in jail, daydreaming about
children.’” Berlin, supra note 37, at 169 (footnote omitted).
212
FOUCAULT, supra note 145, at 90.
213
See discussion supra Part V.B.
214
Runckel, supra note 209, at 589.
215
Casey, supra note 167, at 101 (discussing the respect for autonomy and
personal dignity inherent in the judicial system).
216
Runckel, supra note 209, at 589 (stating that the average sex offender is
likely to commit numerous crimes over his lifetime).
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more crimes.217 The debate surrounding castration as a form of
punishment for sex offenders began when California enacted
the first chemical castration legislation.218 The growth in state
legislation allowing surgical castration and the willingness of
sex offenders to volunteer for the procedure suggest growing
acceptance of the procedure among sex offenders as well as the
court system.219
Considering that deterring sex offender activity has
been difficult and that sex offenders tend to re-offend, surgical
castration is an effective punishment of sex offender activity.
Unlike other forms of punishment, surgical castration is
permanent and drastically reduces the sex offender’s
recidivism rate.
Surgical castration likely violates the Eighth
Amendment’s guarantee that individuals shall be free from
cruel and unusual punishment. But when an informed sex
offender volunteers for surgical castration, the arguments in
support of the Eighth Amendment protection diminish.
Therefore, a sex offender who volunteers for surgical castration
should be allowed to waive the Eighth Amendment protection
from cruel and unusual punishment. Courts may accept the
waiver only when doing so meets the goals of the defendant,
criminal justice system, and society.
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